Do intraclass struggles shape the political terrain on which ensuing struggles, within and between classes, are fought and resolved? Out attempt to answer this question focuses on the rivalry among the factions and parties involved in organizing American industrial workers from the late 1930s on. We assess how the political practices of the Communists and their rivals determined which political camp won power in the new CIO unions. A logit model shows that two ensembles of political practices "loaded the historical dice" in favor of the Communists. The chances that Communists would win union leadership were far higher: first, if the union had seceded from the AFL and joined the CIO from below, in an insurgent workers' movement, rather than from above, in a revolt of its top officers; and second, if the union had been organized independently, rather than by a CIO "organizing committee." Two other political practices indirectly favored the Communists: earlier Red union organizing in the industry (although its effects were contradictory); andforming the union as an amalgamated rather than as a unitary organization.
parties of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) determined who won the leadership of its emergent unions. Our analysis focuses on the Communists-who at that time constituted "the most important minor party in the union world" (Mills 1948 , p. 23)-and their political rivals.
If unionization is an indispensable organizational means for workers to achieve their common interests, those interests are not simply given. Nor, when recognized, do they automatically translate into class organization. On the contrary, their "translation" into class organization inescapably involves combat between the conscious agents of capital and of labor (Griffin et al. 1986 , p. 148). So, the "interests" that workers recognize and act upon are affected both by struggles between them and capital and, we wish to emphasize, struggles among them, over the definition and organization of their common class interests (cf. Przeworski 1977; Stark 1980, pp. 97-98).
For these reasons, the political effects of the political practices involved in organizing CIO unions constitute a critical, theoretically relevant historical case. Put otherwise, historical materials on CIO organizing are what Robert K. Merton terms "strategic research materials (SRM)," for they clearly "exhibit the structure and workings of the phenomena to be understood" (1987, p. 11): namely, the independent effects of intraclass struggles, in this instance, among contending workingclass political factions and parties. Vying for political power in the emerging organized industrial segment of the working class, they had sharply different conceptions of workingclass interests and the political strategies to protect and advance them.
The assorted run-of-the-mill unionists, socialists, Catholic activists, radicals, and Communists involved in organizing the CIO unions were engaged in a simultaneous fight on two fronts. The main front was their common struggle against capital to organize and reorganize workers into industrial unions. The second front was the struggle among these political rivals to win political leadership of the new industrial unions-and thus to actively define the interests and shape the cohesion and self-consciousness of this organized segment of the working class.
Asking our empirical question, that is, whether the political practices of the CIO's contending political camps determined which of them won the leadership of its unions, and asking it in this way, allows us to identify a critical "pocket of theoretical neglect" and of "specifiable and specified ignorance" in political sociology (Merton 1987 Its unexamined premise, however, is that the social bases themselves somehow also account for the existing balance of political forces. How the contending parties and factions were able to establish themselves and thus viably compete to influence workers politically and win their votes in the labor movement and in the wider society is simply ignored.3 This, then, is the rationale of our study: We both pose a central theoretical question that has rarely even been asked in political sociology and try to answer a crucial empirical question derived from it. 4 We focus on the political impact of political struggles, not on their sources; so we do not examine the ideological, programmatic, or strategic issues over which the rival political camps fought. Among these issues, of course, was the Communists' defense of "Stalinism" and the Soviet dictatorship. For, whatever the courage and admirable personal qualities of individual Communist labor organizers and leaders, even the most saintly of them was linked politically to that dictatorship (Zieger 1984 , p. 300). But "most labor leaders actively or passively [fought] Communists," as even an anti-Communist 3 Of course, a few sociologists who have conducted studies in this tradition (e.g., Lipset et al. 1956 , p. 443; Zeitlin 1967, p. 6) have also emphasized that "politics" matters in determining workers' consciousness and organization. But this observation is not integrated into their own empirical analyses. Griffin et al. (1986) is perhaps the only such previous study. Although it is not explicitly formulated in terms of the relative autonomy of politics, its aim clearly is to assess the independent effects of political practices on the organized (or political) relations between classes (cf. also Rubin, Griffin, and Wallace 1983). radical such as C. Wright Mills (1948, pp. 190-91) observed, not out of principled opposition to "Stalinism," but simply "to kill off troublesome factions within their unions" or to solve a problem in "public relations."
During the "Red decade" of the 1930s and beyond, through the early postwar years, the Communists and their allies led a "powerful and pervasive radical movement in American life" (Starobin 1972 , p. x). In particular, they established a broad base in the insurgent industrial unions organized by the CIO. At the height of their strength among U.S. industrial workers, they and their allies led nearly half of the CIO unions and officially represented at least two million workers, or over 30 percent of the CIO's members.5
SOURCES AND METHODS
The 38 CIO unions included here comprise almost all of the known durable CIO "international" unions. Of the 40 internationals at the first postwar CIO convention in 1946 (Kampelman 1957 , pp. 45-47), we omitted one for lack of data, and another because it lasted only a year. All 36 of the unions listed by the Research Institute of America (RIA) (1946, pp. 17-18) are included among our 38.6 We drew our data on the political practices of each union from published historical works. We reviewed every relevant work in search of information that would allow us to categorize each CIO union on our four major independent political variables . 7 Obviously, the attempt to construct the major dependent variable, that is, the "political camp" of the union's leaders, and especially the decision to categorize a union as "Communist-dominated," is inherently controversial. "Red-baiting," or charging that a union organizer or leader was a "Red" or "Communist," was long a standard antiunion tactic used by American capitalists. Many of the old American Federation of Labor (AFL) unions also prohibited Communists from holding union office, or even from union membership. Such prohibitions were also not uncommon in CIO unions, even years before the CIO expelled a dozen so-called "Communist-dominated unions" in 1949 and 1950 (Saposs 1959 Yet, if both analytical tendentiousness and political repression were involved in creating Kampelman's classification of the unions into political camps, we found that (except for minor differences) it accords with our own study of the historical materials.
IS THERE A PATTERN?
How did the Communists and their allies win the leadership and secure a political base in CIO unions? The broad historical answer, and the starting point of our empirical analysis, is that the Communists won "positions of power and trust in the CIO by the standard method of gaining power in U.S. labor unions: by being the organizers" (Mills 1948, p. 196 We abstract here from the sorts of "objective conditions" or structural factors that are usually the focus of sociological explanations of workers' political attitudes and behavior. No doubt they affect workers' struggles and the types of unions and parties which emerge and gain workers' adherence. But they do not determine how these struggles are waged nor who wins and who loses. In this analysis, we assume that such objective conditions remain constant; and we explore how the political relations resulting from political struggles (whether wittingly or not) become integral components of the emergent objective conditions for subsequent struggles.9
The CIO was itself the proximate historical product of intraclass political struggles, which took place in two phases. The first phase, from the early 1920s on, was the fight of Communists and other radicals for industrial unionism both from within and outside the AFL, which refused to organize except along craft or trade lines. The second was the radical response to the labor insurgency of the early 1930s, when top AFL officials. and many AFL unions split over the issue of whether and how to organize the unorganized in the mass production industries.
With the birth of the CIO, rival factions and parties now vied with each other for power in the fledgling organization and its constituent unions. These political struggles and the resultant political relations can be seen as constituting and being constituted by four bundles of historical events: (1) whether there had been earlier Red organizing in an industry; (2) whether the union seceded from the AFL from above, in a revolt of its top officers, or from below, in a workers' insurgency; (3) whether the union was originally organized independently or under the aegis of a CIO "organizing committee"; and (4) whether the union was formed as an amalgamated or as a unitary organization. We emphasize that these historical bundles represent crucial types of political practices and sets of internal relationships among contending political forces.'0 So, these bundles are 8 Important insights concerning the general political processes involved are contained in the narratives of specific struggles by Levenstein and other labor historians cited in our list of references. We have reformulated some of these particularizing and unsystematic observations as explicit hypotheses.
9 We did try to assess the independent effects on the unions' political alignments of some of the "objective economic conditions" of the industries they organized and of some demographic characteristics of the workers in these industries. We discuss this in Appendix 1. 10 Our focus on these "historical bundles" is not arbitrary. They are sets of events, as should become clear from the following discussion, representing crucial formative intraclass struggles over class organization. But of course they do not exhaust the universe of prior intraclass struggles which could also have shaped the CIO's internal balance of political forces. Among these, for instance, are the IWW's organizing efforts in the decade or so before World War 1 and the meant to be "relational concepts," and our attempts to measure them, "relational variables. "
Our empirical analysis is presented in four steps: (1) Explication of the hypotheses and assessment of the evidence, in a set of four bivariate contingency tables, concerning the expected direct effects of each of these political variables. (2) Estimates, through a "logit" analysis, of their independent direct effects. ( As a result, they won some supporters (historians differ on the numbers) among the workers in these industries. They also prepared many others for the coming wave of industrial unionism. In auto, for instance, the Communists had started agitating for an industrial union in 1925 and soon were printing shop papers and distributing them to a dozen of Detroit' s major auto plants (Keeran 1980a But the most brutal terror was reserved for the Communist unions." With no "revolutionary wave" to ride, "the TUUL had to depend on the straining, sweating, and plodding of its own organizers. They were too few, and they tried to do too much" (Draper 1972 , p. 392).
As TUUL's Jack Johnstone lamented in early 1930, "the objective conditions were never better for building militant revolutionary unions, but objective conditions do not create organizations" (quoted from Labor Unity, in Klehr 1984, p. 41, italics added). By 1932, even the few more or less durable Red unions became "for all intents and purposes, moribund." Seeing that the upsurge of labor was bypassing their "dual" unions, the TUUL officially disbanded in mid-1935, and its unions "faded away" (Klehr 1984 , pp.
47, 133).
In some struggles (such as in Harlan County, Kentucky), Draper suggests, the revolutionary intransigence and plain incompetence of the Communists had been so disastrous for the workers involved that once the Communists were driven out, they could never return; in the end, "for all their fortitude and determination, they had nothing concrete to show for their efforts" (1972, pp. 392, 389). But in other struggles in auto, transport, electric, lumber, and shipping, for instance, Communists apparently succeeded, argue Howe and Coser (1957, p. 373), in putting together and holding on to "a kind of skeleton apparatus. In this way the Communists were able to begin functioning in the CIO with an embryonic structure of organizers who knew each other from 'the old days' and, though assigned to different industries, could help one another with regard to both party interests and their own status." If nothing else, the TUEL and TUUL experiences served "as a training ground for the Communist unionist in organization techniques and in administering unions" (Taft 1964 , p. 16). Also, "aside from these organizational advantages," as Glazer (1961, p. 111) emphasizes, "the Communists were in fact founding fathers, with all the moral authority that gives a leader."
On balance, even if nearly all of their "revolutionary unions" were stillborn, and some struggles the Communists led were politically disastrous for them, these hard years of Red organizing also probably created in some industries a cadre of experienced Communist organizers and effective, even charismatic, leaders with a legitimate claim to many workers' support. If this is so, then the Communists should also have had a better chance of winning the leadership of the CIO unions established in the industries where party members had tried to organize Red unions in earlier years (i.e., before the CIO's founding), than in unions established in industries where no such earlier Red organizing had occurred.
Our findings are more or less consistent with this hypothesis. First, over half of the CIO unions in the industries penetrated by earlier Red union organizing were later led by Communists, as compared to 4 out of 10 of the unions in the industries where Red unionists had not actively organized in earlier years. Second, the contrast is sharper when we examine the effect of earlier Red organizing on the subsequent success of the antiCommunists: the percentage of "antiCommunist" unions in industries the Reds had not tried to organize in the pre-CIO era was nearly twice as large as in those they had tried to organize (Table 1 
, Part a).'3 AFL SECESSION: "FROM ABOVE" OR "FROM BELOW"
In the fall of 1936, the AFL "suspended" 10 unions affiliated with the CIO (then still the "Committee on Industrial Organization") on charges of "dual unionism" (the same charge the AFL used to throw out the adherents of the TUEL 11 years earlier) and of "fomenting insurrection." The 10 unions immediately started making their per capita payments to the now independent CIO (Bernstein 1970, pp. 422-23). These founding unions of the 13 As we shall see, Red unionism also had significant indirect effects on the chances the Communists would win union power in later years. We can think of no convincing line of argument that the other insurgent political practices which are examined in the following analysis (insurrection from below, independent organizing, and amalgamation) themselves somehow "reflected" the specific "objective economic conditions" or the social characteristics of the workers in an industry. But in the case of Red union organizing, it is plausible to argue that an industry's structure did have a bearing on the very existence of that insurgent organizing practice and on the success or failure of the Communists in penetrating that industry. We briefly discuss this issue in Appendix 3. CIO, and a few others that soon followed them, came into the new industrial union movement as the result of what we term "a revolt from above." Their top officers broke away from the AFL and joined the CIO with their staff and organizational hierarchy-and much of their union jurisdiction-intact. As a result, they "had a continuity of leadership," Jack Barbash suggests, "that [was] proof, by and large, against Communist domination" (1956, p. 342).
In contrast, most other CIO unions grew out of local and district battles between craft and industrial unionists over the control of their AFL precursors. Such workers' "insurgencies from below" split many AFL unions. The workers in these AFL locals and districts then came into the CIO to form the core of new international unions. This happened, for instance, in the AFL's Upholsterers International Union in 1937, where a number of locals defected from the AFL and combined with some other independent craft unions and a few CIO locals to form the CIO United Furniture Workers (Peterson 1944 , p. 135). Other struggles "from below" took place in the newly chartered AFL "federal labor unions," that is, the newly organized locals given a temporary AFL charter to "store workers" until they could be "parcelled out" to AFL craft affiliates (Bernstein 1970, p. 355) . Some seceded from the AFL to become the locals of a new CIO union, rather than be parcelled out and subordinated to craft control. Of the 18 CIO unions in our study that seceded from the AFL as the result of an insurgent workers' movement, 4 originated in battles in federal unions, the other 14 in rebellions in various locals and districts of existing AFL unions.
Often the leaders of the local rebellions against the craft leadership were radicals of various stripes, including Communists and their allies. Unlike the situation in the former AFL unions that came into the CIO from above, these left leaders had the opportunity to gain secure political bases in the new CIO unions they built in struggles from below. For these reasons, we suggest that far more of the unions that had been born from below than from above would be Communist-led. We find, indeed, that the numbers of Communist-led unions in each category differ sharply. Nearly three-fourths of the CIO unions whose secession from the AFL had come through workers' insurgence were later led by Communists and their allies; but fewer than one-sixth of the AFL internationals whose top officers had broken away to join the CIO were later Communist-led. Seven other CIO unions were independent non-AFL unions before the CIO was established (e.g., the Federation of Architects, Engineers, Chemists, and Technicians) or were organized in an industry that had no prior AFL union (e.g., the Farm Equipment Workers [FE]). Because they also joined the CIO with their organizational hierarchies intact, we included them in the "from above" category, which raises the proportion of Communist-led unions in that category to one-fourth. The effect of the type of secession on the chances that anti-Communists would win union leadership is especially sharp. Nearly half of the unions that joined the CIO from above were in the anti-Communist camp compared to only one-twentieth of those that joined from below (Table 1 Communists were spotted, or became too dangerous a threat, they were discharged" (Saposs 1959, p. 122) . SWOC organizers were all hired, paid, and fired by the head office. When they organized a local, the SWOC moved them to another area, allowing SWOC officials to take control (Taft 1964, p. 57). "Thus, a Communist who had helped to organize twenty-five SWOC locals lamented," says Levenstein (1981, p. 51), "that despite a few successes, Communists 'weren't too successful' in wooing the leaders of the locals they helped to organize." Communists played an important role in the four-year battle to organize "Little Steel," the violently antiunion steel companies that held out long after the US Steel Co. capitulated. "But when the struggle was over, they were quietly fired by SWOC head Philip Murray."
In auto, in contrast, a host of contending radical, Communist, Socialist, Coughlinite Catholic, and other factions competed to organize the unorganized and to win power in the new CIO union. The UAW financed much of its own organizing drives by collecting dues from the workers. Although the CIO also contributed money and organizers to the Ford drive, top CIO officials had little direct influence on the conduct of the campaigns against the big auto companies. As a result, "even at the height of CIO influence in the internal affairs of the UAW," the CIO was unable to impose "outside leadership" (Galenson 1960, p. 133). Also, the major auto companies bitterly resisted unionization. GM, for instance, agreed to bargain with the CIO union only after a tenacious and often violent struggle with the workers. In these battles, and in some of the decisive sit-down strikes-for example, in Flint, "the first great victory" for the UAW "and one of the epic confrontations in American labor history" (Zieger 1986 , pp. 46-47)-Communists gained a reputation as superb organizers and combative and courageous leaders. Consequently, they were able to create strong rank-and-file groups in the auto industry (Galenson 1960 , p. 150) .
We suggest that the chances that Communists could build their own base and later win the union's leadership would be higher where they were involved in independent organizing than where they organized as employees of a CIO organizing committee. Aside from the moral authority they commanded as militant organizers in the fight against the companies, the Communists could, where there was no CIO organizing committee to stand in their way, "bring in reinforcements on the lower levels who could provide a solid layer of support for its people on top" (Howe and Coser 1957, p. 377).
For these reasons, we expect that far more of the unions that had been built by independent organizers than by CIO organizing committees would be led by Communists and their allies. We find that, indeed, the Communists won leadership in one-sixth of the unions organized by CIO organizing committees compared to two-thirds of the independently organized unions. Also, the percentage of unions organized by CIO organizing committees that later were led by "anti-Communists" was over twice the percentage among independently organized unions (see Table 1 In the UAW, one of the most influential of the organized factions was led by Communists. They were among the leaders of several important locals, including "the world's biggest local," Local 600 at Ford's River Rouge plant. They also had political bonds to powerful non-Communist allies forged during the sit-down strikes. Although they were highly influential, the Communists made no effort to take over the union's leadership (Glazer 1961 
LOGIT ESTIMATES OF DIRECT EFFECTS
What were the independent direct effects of each political practice, taking the effects of the others into account? We constructed both a logit and a probit model to measure the independent effects. The substantive results of both models are identical: only secession from below and independent organizing had substantial (and statistically significant) independent direct effects in determining which CIO unions would be in the Communist political camp. We present only the results of the logit model (Table 2) . Logit modeling provides not only coefficients interpretable as Controlling for the effects of the other three political practices, we find that the odds that unions would later be led by Communists were 8.5 times greater if they had been independently organized than if they had been organized by a CIO organizing committee. Similarly, the odds that unions would later be led by Communists were about 7 times greater if they had seceded from the AFL from below rather than from above. On the other hand, the odds that unions would be led by Communists were only 1.2 times greater for an industry with earlier Red organizing than for an industry without it. The odds were also 1.2 times greater for amalgamated than for unitary unions.
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS
So, neither earlier Red organizing nor amalgamation had sizeable direct effects on the odds that the Communists would win union power. What do these findings imply? Were these two insurgent political practices of little import in shaping the CIO's internal political lineups?
Most important, were the long, hard years of Red union organizing wasted, scarcely leaving any working-class legacy of industrial unionism for the CIO organizers who later followed in their footsteps? In the end, did the Red unionists, as Draper suggests, have almost nothing concrete to show for their efforts? The short answer is a sort of complicated "no." Our "theoretical model" suggests (see Figure 1 ) and our findings tend to confirm that these "premature" struggles to build industrial unions had complex and sometimes contradictory indirect political effects in shaping the two decisive political practices -secession from below and independent organizing-that allowed the Communists to win the leadership of the new CIO unions.
We offer three related hypotheses about the indirect effects of earlier Red organizing. First, it probably had contradictory effects on independent organizing. On the one hand, the presence of some experienced Red organizers in an industry should have improved the (Table 3 , part a). Second, we suggest that amalgamation was more likely in industries that had been penetrated by earlier Red unionism than in those that had not been. Some former Red unions or their remnants which retained sufficient independence and cohesion (e.g., James Matles's Metal Workers) were able to amalgamate with other such remnants, AFL federal locals or independent unions as a strategy to build new CIO unions. This, we suggest, enhanced the capacity of these unions to go it alone (i.e., without CIO tutelage) in unionizing their industry. In turn, establishing a union through independent organizing would increase the Communists' chances to win its leadership. Our findings strikingly support this reasoning. Over half of the unions in industries penetrated by earlier Red organizing were formed through amalgamation. But over nine-tenths of the unions in the industries untouched by earlier Red organizing were formed as unitary organizations (Table 3, were aimed at building independent "revolutionary unions," many Reds continued to organize oppositions and to try to win leadership in existing AFL unions.
In 1934, a year before the dissolution of the TUEL and the decision to return to the AFL, a confidential Communist Party memorandum reported that Communists were in the leadership of 135 AFL locals, with 50.000 members, and of "several" entire union districts. The Communists also led organized opposition groups in another 500 locals (Klehr 1984 , p. 225) . The next year, with the TUUL's dissolution, these Communist bases in hundreds of AFL locals were reinforced, and new ones were established when its union remnants rejoined the AFL, as units if possible, or as individuals if necessary.
Thus, we suggest that these hundreds of Communist-led locals and opposition groups were probably among the main centers involved in what AFL officials condemned as fomenting insurrection against them and leading the workers out of the AFL into the burgeoning CIO unions. Again, our findings strongly support this hypothesis. In the industries that had been a focus of earlier Red union drives, six-tenths of the CIO unions were born in rebellions from below, while in the industries that had not been penetrated, seven-tenths were led into the CIO from above (Table 3, 
part c).
A union's secession from the AFL in a workers' insurgency, as we have seen, increased the chances that the Communists would win the leadership of these unions. But, as our theoretical model suggests, this also indirectly favored their winning union leadership: the unions that seceded from below were also far more likely than those that seceded from above to amalgamate and then go on to organize independently (see Table 4 ); in turn, this increased the chances that the Communists rather than other factions would win union power. This means that if earlier Red unionism had contradictory effects on independent organizing, it also had a positive effect on the Communists' chances of winning power, both through secession from below and amalgamation. Assessing the effects of the employers' responses to unionism would be necessary to "round out" our analysis. How did the varying levels and kinds of employer resistance or accommodation to unionization affect the political practices of the contending CIO political camps? How, in turn, did this affect the odds that Communists, rather than their CIO rivals, would win the workers' trust and take power in the new unions? To provide a systematic empirical answer to these questions will require primary historical research on, at least, the stance taken toward unionization by each of the major corporations in all of the industries organized by CIO unions during the wave of unionization in the late 1930s. In steel, for example, U.S. Steel ("Big Steel") suddenly and surprisingly capitulated to the Steel Workers Organizing Committee in 1937, while the so-called "Little Steel" companies engaged in a bitter four-year battle before grudgingly recognizing the union. On the basis of such industry-by-industry research, it would be possible to assess the relatively independent effects of both class and intraclass struggles in determining the political alignments within the CIO.
In any event, our analysis reveals that concrete intraclass struggles can create, wittingly or not, new objective political relations which tend in turn to shape the organized working class' internal political alignments.
If our analysis has shown the relative autonomy of political struggles in making history, it emphatically does not imply a "voluntaristic theory" of politics or of social change. The original historical opening for the left in the working class was provided by an extraordinary crisis of American capitalism, the consequent political upheavals at all levels of government-local, state, and federal, legislative, executive, and judicial-and the unprecedented, primarily spontaneous, "labor upsurge" of the 1930s (Brody 1980 But the Communists and other radicals of the 1930s involved in the leadership and organization of the working class were not mere "corks riding a flood." They were active, self-conscious men and women, and they were not merely "riding" but struggling to give shape to the sudden social eruption in which they were leading participants. This social eruption, this "flood," did not determine what happened, except in the sense that it constituted, as we emphasized at the outset, a realm of immanent historical alternatives. Since union-specific data do not exist for the "objective economic conditions" and demographic characteristics of industries in the 1930s or 1940s, we had to use U.S. Census industry-level (fourdigit SIC) data. But many unions lack such data. Moreover, we doubt that measures based on industry-level data are reliable and valid measures of union attributes. First, the jurisdictions and memberships of CIO unions often cut across the boundaries of several SICs. Many of the unions had to be categorized, on the basis of our best estimates, into several different SICs. We assigned very rough estimates of industry weights in the absence of union-specific data. We examined the relationships with and without these weights and found no substantively important differences. Second, unless an industry is quite homogeneous on a given variable, it may not be correct to infer from an industry characteristic to the union. We found no theoretically relevant bivariate relationship between any independent variable and the union's political camp, with one exception. Unions in industries with a high proportion (25 percent or more) of skilled craftsmen were less likely than low ones (under 10 percent) to be in the Communist political camp; but the relationship is curvilinear. Unions in industries with "medium" proportions (10-24.9 percent) skilled craftsmen were by far the least likely to be led by Communists. That Communist-led unions were less likely to be in high-skilled than low-skilled industries-given the AFL's preeminence among craftsmen-is what we would expect. But it could be misleading because, for instance, a CIO union in an industry with a high proportion of skilled craftsmen might, nonetheless, have few skilled members. These craftsmen could be members of one or more long-standing AFL unions. (This was true of Mine, Mill and the AFL unions in nonferrous mining.) But the question remains: Did the strategy of class organization and the consequent political practices of the organizers have different political consequences, depending on variations in the economic conditions in an industry and/or in its internal social composition? That is, was there interaction (or specification) among the variables, such that the "economic" or "social" conditions in an industry determined the measurable effects of the political practices? Alas, we can have no confidence in the results of our efforts in this regard because these variables are at best crude and at worst misleading indicators of the actual conditions in the industry encountered by union organizers. Further, not only are there many missing cases, but the number of cases with adequate data varies considerably from one variable to another. Moreover, the sparsity of cases varies at different values of these variables. Such unavoidable flaws in the data make an analysis of interaction effects worthless.
Yet, for variables with enough cases, we did examine several theoretically relevant logit models which also include economic and demographic variables. We found that, controlling for these variables, the direct effects of the political variables did not meaningfully differ from the original logit model. The % skilled craftsmen has a small negative effect on the odds of Communist union leadership; but it does not remain significant in a reduced model, that is, one omitting control variables lacking significant effects. Unexpectedly, the % nonwhite has a small significant negative effect. These logit tables are available from the authors.
APPENDIX 2 On the Appropriateness of Significance Tests and of Logit Modeling
Significance Tests. Although we report significance levels in our tables, we are not convinced that tests of statistical significance are appropriate for this empirical analysis. In particular, in Tables la, l.d, 3.a, and 4.b, we have allowed ourselves to think seriously about theoretically salient bivariate relationships which fall below the conventional acceptable .05 confidence level.
We question whether it is appropriate to use significance tests here to reject a given finding. First, the small number of cases (38) in the population of CIO unions means that even strong relationships could be rejected at the .05 confidence level. Second, causal relationships are not uncovered by tests of significance. A large enough sample can yield small effects that are statistically significant but substantively unimportant (Swafford 1980, p. 687). Rather, causal connections are revealed by demonstrating, in successive approximations to the underlying realities, the existence of a coherent set of theoretically relevant empirical relationships. After providing estimates of the direct effects of the political variables, we also present a "theoretical model" to illustrate the presumed causal connections. Third, this study is an exploratory and not a confirmatory study. Indeed, it is "designed to find out what was not even guessed at before" (see Lipset et al. [1956, p. 483] ). In trying to explore a new, theoretically relevant subarea of inquiry, it makes sense to try to think through the implications of all theoretically salient, empirical relationships.
Logit Modeling. Using a logit model may not be fully appropriate here because our data do not meet all the assumptions for such modeling. In particular, a much larger number of cases than ours (38) is necessary for the approximations to be adequate. Our N of 38 is far from "asymptotic."
But the logit formulation provides a convenient technique for describing relationships among binary events; and the variables in our analysis are both theoretically and empirically binary. Further, the logit analysis is not meant to "confirm" formal hypotheses, but to enhance the credibility of our substantive theory. In addition, the results of the logit analysis are consistent with the results of a conventional examination of contingency tables. On balance, then, we have decided to present the results of the logit analysis of independent effects. We have not applied a full pathlike model because its applicability to our data is especially problematic. To apply structural equations and path analysis to discrete data, we would have to make several untenable assumptions. For instance, the models developed by Winship and Mare (1983) assume a recursive structure, but, again, it is not possible to test this assumption. In addition, in their "Model Four" (i.e., the model for binary variables without an underlying continuum), which is the closest to our own situation, it is assumed that no measurement error exists. But this would be a silly assumption in a sociohistorical analysis, especially one based on secondary sources. Overall, the use of logit modeling to describe independent effects stretches our data, but permissibly so. But a full pathlike model would force us to make assumptions that we are not willing to make.
APPENDIX 3 On Red Unionism
Did an industry's structure have an important bearing on the success of early Red union organizing? The Communists were inveterate seekers after the right "objective conditions" in which to carry out their activities. So, the TUEL and its successor TUUL targeted certain industries because they considered organizing them critical in the struggle to organize all industrial workers (e.g., such core mass production industries as steel, auto, chemicals). In short, it could be argued that earlier Red union organizing had an impact precisely where "objective conditions" favored it. If so, the apparent indirect effects of earlier Red unionism on the chances of subsequent Communist union leadership could be spurious. They might reflect instead the "objective conditions" of the industries at the time the Red unionists originally penetrated them.
Yet Communists often tried to organize industries that were neither "strategic" nor characterized by objective conditions that might favor industrial unionism. As Levenstein (1981, p. 71) emphasizes, "Often their egalitarian impulse led [the Communists] to expend inordinate energy on organizing those least powerful and least strategically placed: tragic cases such as the migrant workers, 'losers' such as southern textile workers, the infinitely replaceable Macy' s salesclerks, or hospital workers." Howe and Coser (1957, pp. 257, 272), assessing the Red unionists' activities during the revolutionary "Third Period," make the same point. In their view, the Communists bowed to Comintern decisions that ignored the real situation in the United States. "TUUL leaders and members often displayed a heroism and selfsacrifice which no amount of political disagreement should deter anyone from admiring." But time after time, in one industry after another, from coal mining to textiles, say Howe and Coser, the Reds led workers into disastrous strikes and senseless efforts, where the objective conditions were heavily, and obviously, against them.
For these reasons, we doubt that "objective conditions" in the extraordinarily diverse industries penetrated by the TUEL and TUUL could account for the enduring impact of their years of Red union organizing. Indeed, Communists went on to win the leadership of unions in a broad range of entirely different industries, and to lose and win in others whose objective conditions appear to have been quite similar (also see Glazer 1961, p. 120).
Most important, "objective conditions," as TUUL leader Jack Johnstone said, do not organize workers. The Red unionists' decision to try to organize an industry, for any reason ("strategic," "revolutionary," or "egalitarian impulse"), is itself a political act which has its own independent political consequences, whatever the existing "objective conditions." To assess the effects of industry structure on earlier Red unionism will require primary historical research on the TUEL and TUUL's varying organizing successes and failures and on the nature of the industries in which they occurred. 
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